circumstances, of partial rebuffs and defeats. In mere physical courage the recruit or militiaman is generally not deficient; he can fight,—he proposes to fight,—and he can usually be relied on to fight; but, in the first place, he must be brought upon the field in good order and condition ; and secondly, he must have no cause to distrust the skill of his commanders, or the possibility of achieving success. Subject him to the ordinary vicissitildes of warfare, and his confidence departs, his courage leaves him, he becomes deaf to the calls of his oilictn'H, and utterly untrustworthy. In handling green, undisciplined troops, therefore, it is wiser, as a rule,, to remain on the defensive.[1]

Similar considerations apply to the subject of carrying out complicated operations with untried officers. Inexperienced division and brigade commanders can rarely be made to work together, even under the most skilful generals.

The task, therefore, which lay before General McDowell was a much more difficult one than that which he was forcing upon his adversary. McDowell was obliged either to carry the line of Bull Bun by main force, or to conceit a turning-movement and carry his array or a part of it beyond the stream, where he could attack his enemy in the open field.

Either of these courses had great difficulties. He chose the latter. lie had at first intended to turn his adversary's right, and, passing to the south of the Junction, to reach Home point on the Orange and Alexandria Kail road to the Bouthwest of Manassaa

[1] £/"•» Johnston's *Narratwt)* 50,